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This  paper  uses  ECHP  for  14  EU  countries  to  explore  the  dynamic  structure  of  individual 
earnings and the extent to which changes in cross-sectional earnings inequality reflect transitory 
or  permanent  components  of  individual  lifecycle  earnings  variation.  Increases  in  inequality 
reflect increases in permanent differentials in four countries and increases in both components in 
two.  Decreases  in  inequality  reflect  decreases  in  transitory  differentials  in  four  countries,  in 
permanent differentials in two and in both components in rest. In general, increases in inequality 
are  accompanied  by  decreases  in  mobility,  whereas  only  in  three  countries  the  increase  in 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Interest in the extent of individual earnings dynamics has increased greatly in recent years and 
was fuelled mainly by the rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries 
during the 1980s and 1990s, which triggered a strong debate with respect to the driving factors 
and the implications of this increase.  
This paper analyses the dynamic structure of individual earnings in order to explain what is 
happening  behind  the  changes  in  the  distribution  of  labour  market  income  across  14  EU 
countries over the period 1994-2001 using ECHP. More precisely, the aim is to examine the 
extent to which changes in cross-sectional earnings inequality reflect transitory or permanent 
components of individual lifecycle earnings variation. So far, at the EU level, no study attempted 
to analyse and to understand in a comparative manner earnings dynamics and the contributions 
of changes in permanent and transitory components of earnings variation to the evolution of 
cross-sectional earnings inequality.  
Understanding wage dynamics is vitally important from a welfare perspective, particularly given 
the large variation in the evolution of cross-sectional wage inequality across Europe over the 
period 1994-2001. It is highly relevant to understand what the source of this variation is. Did the 
increase  in  cross-sectional  wage  inequality  observed  in  some  countries  result  from  greater 
transitory fluctuations in earnings and individuals facing a higher degree of earnings mobility? 
Or  is this rise reflecting  increasing permanent differences  between  individuals with  mobility 
remaining constant or even  falling?  What about countries that recorded a decrease  in cross-
sectional earnings inequalities, what lessons can we learn from them? Is this decrease the effect 
of  an  increase  in  mobility  which  helped  individuals  improve  their  income  position  in  the 
distribution of permanent income? Are there common trends in earnings inequality and mobility 
across different countries? Understanding the contributions of the  changes  in permanent and 
transitory components of earnings variation to increased cross-sectional earnings inequality is 
very  useful  in  the  evaluation  of  alternative  hypotheses  for  wage  structure  changes  and  for 
determining the potential welfare consequences of rising inequality. (Katz and Autor 1999)  
These questions are highly relevant in the context of the changes that took place in the EU labour 
market policy framework after 1995 under the incidence of the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy and 2 
 
the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, which recommended policies to increase wage flexibility, lower non-
wage labour costs and allow relative wages to better reflect individual differences in productivity 
and local labour market conditions. (OECD 2004; Dew-Becker and Gordon 2008) This appears 
to have worsened the apparent trade-off between a strong employment performance and a more 
equal distribution of earnings, consistent with relative labour demand having shifted towards 
high-skilled workers. OECD (2004) 
As pointed out by OECD (2004) and Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008), the most notable change 
after 1995 in Europe has been increased country heterogeneity. We will investigate how this 
heterogeneity  translates  itself  in  the  level  and  components  of  the  cross-sectional  earnings 
inequality  and  earnings  mobility.  Equally  weighted  minimum  distance  methods  are  used  to 
estimate  the  covariance  structure  of  earnings,  decompose  earnings  into  a  permanent  and  a 
transitory component and conclude about their evolution.  
The structure of this paper  is as  follows. Section two presents an overview of the  literature 
review. Section three introduces the theoretical background for wage differentials. Section four 
provides a description of the data. Section  five  introduces the econometric  specification and 
estimation method. Section six describes the dynamic structure of individual log earnings for 14 
EU countries. Section seven fits the error components models to the covariance structure for 
each country, decomposing the change in inequality into that accounted for by the change in the 
permanent and transitory components. Lastly, section eight offers some conclusions. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
The  existing  literature  on  earnings  dynamics  is  predominantly  based  on  US  data.  Atkinson, 
Bourguignon et al. (1992) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on earnings dynamics 
until 1992. Earlier work focused on fitting statistical models to the earnings process. E.g. Lillard 
and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989) fitted 
models to the autocovariance structure of earnings and hours, but they did not account for the 
changes in the autocovariance structure of earnings over time.  
Later work, Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995; 1998; 2002) used PSID to estimate the permanent and 
transitory components of male earnings and how it evolved over time. In Moffitt and Gottschalk 
(1998), the earnings process was fit by a permanent component, modelled as a random walk in 3 
 
age  and  a  highly  persistent  serially  correlated  transitory  component,  with  weights  on  these 
components  for  each  year.  They  found  that  the  increase  in  the  cross-sectional  inequality  of 
individual earnings and wage rates in the U.S. between 1969-1991 has been roughly equally 
composed of increases in the variances of the permanent and transitory components of earnings, 
with little change in earnings mobility rates. Since most of the theoretical explanations for the 
increase in inequality have been aimed at explaining increases in the variance of the permanent 
component of earnings (e.g. increases in the price of skills), they found their result surprising and 
unexpected. Therefore, in their most recent study, Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) estimated the 
trend in the transitory variance of male earnings using PSID from 1970 to 2004. They found that 
the transitory variance increased substantially in the 1980’s and remained at the same level until 
2004, for both less and more educated workers. Moreover, the transitory variance appears to 
have a strong cyclical component: its increase accounts for between 30% and 65% of the rise in 
the overall inequality, depending on the period.  
Using  the  PSID,  Baker  (1997)  compared  two  competing  specifications  for  the  permanent 
component  of  earnings:  the  “profile  heterogeneity  or  the  random  growth  model”  and  the 
“random walk model”. In spite of the increased popularity of the latter, Baker (1997) proved that 
the profile heterogeneity model provides a better representation of the data. 
Baker and Solon (2003) decomposed the growth in earnings inequality into its persistent and 
transitory components using longitudinal income tax records from Canada. The earnings process 
was fit by a permanent component, modelled as a mixed process composed of a random growth 
and a random walk in age and a highly persistent serially correlated transitory component, with 
weights  on  these  components  for  each  year.  They  found  that  growth  in  earnings  inequality 
reflects both an increase in the long-run inequality and an increase in earnings instability.  
Up until recently, little work has been carried out in Europe on the dynamic nature of individual 
earnings. Dickens (2000) analysed the pattern of individual male wages over time in UK using 
the New Earnings Survey (NES) panel data set for the period 1975-1995. This study divided the 
data into year birth cohorts and analysed the auto-covariance structure of hourly and weekly 
earnings for each cohort. In the tradition of Moffitt and Gottschalk (1998), the earnings process 
was fit by a permanent component, modelled as a random walk in age and a highly persistent 
serially correlated transitory component, with weights on these components for each year. The 4 
 
results  showed  that  about  half  of  the  rise  of  the  overall  cross-sectional  inequality  can  be 
explained by the rise in the permanent variance and the rest by the rise in the persistent transitory 
component.  
Ramos (2003) analysed the dynamic structure of earnings in UK using the British Household 
Panel  Study  for  the  period  1991-1999.  The  earnings  specification  followed  a  similar 
specification with Baker and Solon (2003). Using information on monthly earnings of male full-
time employees, this study decomposed the covariance structure of earnings into its permanent 
and transitory components and concluded that the increase in inequality over the 1990’s was due 
to  increased  in  earnings  volatility.  Moreover,  the  relative  earnings  persistent  was  found  to 
decline over the lifecycle, which implies a lower mobility for younger cohorts. These findings 
are at odds with previous literature on earnings dynamics both for UK and the OECD. Unlike 
previous literature, this study considered also for the effect of observed characteristics and found 
that  human  capital  and  job  related  characteristics  account  for  nearly  all  persistent  earnings 
differences and that the transitory component is highly persistent. 
Kalwij and Alessie (2003) examined the variance-covariance structure of log-wages over time 
and over the lifecycle of British men from 1975 to 2001, controlling for cohort effects. Their 
model follows closely the specification used by Abowd and Card (1989), Dickens (2000) and 
Baker and Solon (2003) accounting also for cohort effects. They showed that the increase in the 
cross-sectional  inequality was caused  mainly  by the  increase  in the transitory  component of 
earnings  and  to  a  lesser  extent  by  an  increase  in  the  permanent  wage  inequality.  Thus  the 
increase in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by an increase in earnings mobility.  
Cappellari (2003) used the Italian National Social Security Institute for the period 1979-1995 and 
decomposed  the  male  earnings  autocovariance  structure  into  its  long-term  and  transitory 
components using a model specification similar with Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) and Backer 
(1997). The model included a permanent component, modelled as a random growth in age and a 
highly persistent serially correlated transitory component, with weights on these components for 
each  year  and  cohort.  The  findings  showed  that  growth  was  determined  by  the  long-term 
earnings component. Other evidence on the contribution of permanent and transitory earnings 
components  to  cross-sectional  inequality  has  become  available  in  recent  year  in  Sweden 
(Gustavson, 2004). 5 
 
3.  THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
3.1.Determinants of earnings inequality  
As pointed out by Katz and Autor (1999), the existing literature contains many explanations for 
the rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries during the 1980s and 
1990s. One approach for explaining changes in wage differential is to decompose overall wage 
inequality into permanent inequality and transitory inequality. 
Following the terminology introduced by Friedman and Kuznets (1954), individual earnings are 
composed of a permanent and a transitory component. The permanent component of earnings 
reflects personal characteristics, education, training and other systematic elements. The transitory 
component captures the chance and other factors influencing earnings in a particular period and 
is expected to average out over time. Following the structure of  individual earnings, overall 
inequality at any point in time is composed from inequality in the transitory component and 
inequality  in  the  permanent  component  of  earnings.  The  evolution  of  the  overall  earnings 
inequality is determined by the cumulative changes in the two inequality components.  
The  rise  in  the  inequality  in  the  permanent  component  of  earnings  may  be  consistent  with 
increasing returns to education, on-the-job training and other persistent abilities that are among 
the  main  determinants  of  the  permanent  component  of  earnings,  meaning  enhanced  relative 
earnings position of the highly skilled individuals. (Mincer 1957; Mincer 1958; Mincer 1962; 
Mincer 1974; Hause 1980).  
The increase in the inequality of the transitory component of earnings may be attributed to the 
weakening  of  the  labour  market  institutions  (e.g.  unions,  government  wage  regulation,  and 
internal labour markets), increased labour market instability, increased competitiveness, a rise in 
the temporary workforce which increase earnings exposure to shocks. A period of skill-biased 
technological change with the  spread of  new technologies can on the one  hand  increase the 
demand for skills, and on the other hand it can increase earnings instability. (Katz and Autor 
1999).  Rodrik  (1997)  argued  that  also  globalization  and  international  capital  mobility  can 
increase wage instability. Overall, the increase in the return to persistent skills is expected to 
have a much larger impact on long-run earnings inequality than an increase in the transitory 
component of earnings. (Katz and Autor 1999; Moffitt and Gottschalk 2002) 6 
 
3.1.1.  Alternative model specifications for the permanent and transitory components  
Next we introduce several models of earnings dynamics that have been dominating the literature 
on  permanent  and  transitory  earnings  inequality  over  the  past  30  years.  To  begin  with,  we 
introduce the simplest specification, which in spite of its simplicity provides a very intuitive 
insight  into  the  decomposition  of  earnings  into  their  permanent  and  transitory  components. 
Based on this specification earnings are being decomposed as follows: 
 
2 2 , (0, ), (0, ), 1,..., , 1,..., it i it i it v i Y v iid v iid t T i N µ µ µ σ σ = + = = ∼ ∼   (1) 
where  i µ   represents  the  permanent  time-invariant  individual  specific  component  and  it v  
represents the transitory component, which is independent distributed both over individuals and 
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Because i µ   is  assumed  to  incorporate  the  effect  of  lifetime  persistent  individual  specific 
characteristics  such  as  ability,  the  variance  of  the  permanent  component 
2
µ σ   represents  the 
persistent dispersion of earnings or the inequality in the permanent component of earnings. The 
transitory shocks are captured by the transitory variance 
2
v σ  and are assumed to persist only one 
year.  
This model facilitates the understanding of the inequality decomposition into its permanent and 
transitory components. The  variance of earnings at a certain point  in time,  as  a  measure of 
earnings dispersion, is composed both from a permanent and transitory dispersion (
2 2
v µ σ σ + ). The 
covariances,  on  the  other  hand,  are  determined  solely  by  the  permanent  component  (
2
µ σ ). 
Therefore,  the  assessment  of  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  components  in  the  overall 
earnings dispersion is straightforward: the ratio 
2 2 / y µ σ σ  captures the relative importance of the 
permanent  component,  whereas  the  ratio 
2 2 / v y σ σ   captures  the  relative  importance  of  the 
transitory component.  7 
 
Notwithstanding  its  attractive  features,  the  empirical  evidence  rejected  the  rigid  restrictions 
imposed by model (1). One of the main drawbacks of model (1) is that it does not allow for 
changes  in earnings  inequality over time. (Lillard and  Willis 1978;  Lillard and  Weiss 1979; 
MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989) Other studies (Katz 1994; Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995) 
took the model complexity further by allowing the covariance structure of earnings to vary over 
time.  To  account  for  these  time  effects,  these  models  considered  also  time  specific  loading 
factors or shifters on both components, which allow the parameters of the process to change with 
calendar time.  
1 2 it t it t it Y v λ µ λ = +     (2) 
, 1,2 kt k λ =   are time-varying  factor  loadings  on  the  permanent  and  transitory  components  of 
earnings. The variance of  it Y  implied by this model takes the form: 
2 2
1 2
2 2 ( )
t t it v Var Y µ λ σ λ σ = +     (3) 
An increase in either time loading factors generates an increase in the cross-sectional earnings 
inequality.  The  nature  of  the  change  in  inequality  depends  on  which  of  the  loading  factors 
changes. On the one hand, a persistent rise in  1t λ  increases the permanent or long-run inequality 
(inequality in earnings measured over a long period of time, such as lifetime earnings). As  1t λ  
can be interpreted as time-varying return to skills or skill price, its increase suggests that the 
relative  labour  market  advantage  of  high  skill  workers  is  enhanced.  In  this  situation,  the 
autocovariances grow in greater proportion that than the variance, causing the autocorrelation to 
increase. As a consequence, the increase in overall cross-sectional inequality is accompanied by 
a decrease in mobility. On the other hand, an increase in  2t λ  without a change in  1t λ  increases 
cross-sectional earnings inequality by increasing the transitory inequality, but without any impact 
on long-run or permanent inequality. In this situation the rise in the variances is not accompanied 
by a rise in the autocovariances, hence autocorrelations decrease and the increase in the overall 
inequality is accompanied by an increase in mobility. (Baker and Solon 2003) As pointed out by 
Katz and Autor (1999),  1t λ  maintains the rank of the individuals in the earnings distribution, but 
causes a persistent increase in the spread of the distribution and an increase in  2t λ  changes the 
rank  of  the  individual  in  the  short-run.  In  other  words  an  increase  in  the  time  parameters 8 
 
associated with the permanent component of earnings indicates a growing earnings inequality 
with no impact on the relative position of individuals in the distribution of permanent earnings, 
whereas an increase in the transitory time parameters indicates an increase in earnings mobility. 
Although model (2) incorporates changes over time in the permanent and temporary components 
of earnings inequality, it disregards other important features of earnings dynamics. Firstly, it 
disregards the cohort effects. As argued by Katz and Autor (1999), the increased wage inequality 
may arise from increased dispersion of unobserved labour quality within recent entry cohorts, 
resulting from unequal school quality. Some studies brought evidence against the hypothesis that 
the return to education is the same for different cohorts. These changes could be attributed either 
to the cohort effects or to the larger impact of the labour market shocks on younger than on older 
cohorts of workers. In the same line of thought, Freeman (1975) put forward the “active labour 
market”  hypothesis,  which  postulates  that  changes  in  the  labour  market  conditions,  such  as 
changes in the supply and demand for skills, affect mainly new entrants in the labour market. To 
account for these cohort effects, these models considered also cohort specific loading factors or 
shifters on both components, which allow the parameters of the process to change with cohort.  
1 1 2 2 it c t it c t it Y v γ λ µ γ λ = +     (4) 
where , 1,2 jc j γ = are cohort specific loading factors. 
Secondly, regarding the permanent component, some studies brought evidence in favour of the 
“random growth rate model” or the “profile heterogeneity model”: (Hause 1977; Lillard and 
Weiss 1979; MaCurdy 1982; Baker 1997; Cappellari 2003)  
2 2 , (0, ), (0, ), ( , ) it i i it i i i i age iid iid E µ ϕ µϕ µ µ ϕ µ σ ϕ σ µ ϕ σ = + = ∼ ∼   (5) 
According to this model, which is consistent with labour market theories such as human capital, 
and  matching  models,  each  individual  has  a  unique  age-earning  profile  with  an  individual 
specific intercept (initial earnings  i µ ) and slope (earnings growth  i ϕ ) that may be systematically 
related. The variances 
2
µ σ  and
2
ϕ σ  capture individual heterogeneity with respect to time-invariant 
characteristics and age-earnings profiles. The covariance between  i µ  and  i ϕ , ,, , µϕ σ ,  ,  ,  , represents a 
key  element  in  the  development  of  earnings  differentials  over  the  active  life.  A  positive 
covariance  between  i µ   and  i ϕ   implies  a  rising  inequality  in  the  permanent  component  of 9 
 
earnings over the life cycle. This is consistent with the school-matching models where the more 
tenure one individual accumulates, the more is revealed about his ability. Thus highly educated 
people are expected to experience a faster growth in their earnings as the quality of the match is 
revealed to their employers. A negative covariance implies that the two sources of heterogeneity 
offset  each  other,  which  is  consistent  with  the  on-the-job  training  hypothesis  (Mincer  1974; 
Hause 1980). A negative covariance is expected to generate mobility within the distribution of 
the permanent component of earnings. (Cappellari 2003) 
This structure is equivalent to a random coefficient model where the intercept and the coefficient 
on age in model (5) are randomly distributed across individuals. Therefore, because earnings 
evolve along an individual specific age profile, a good prediction of future earnings requires 
additional information besides the current earnings. 
An alternative/additional specification for the permanent component of earnings is the “random 
walk model” or the “unit root model”, which is used in the literature to accommodate earnings 
shocks that might have permanent effects: (MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989; Moffitt and 
Gottschalk 1995; Dickens 2000).  
2
, 1 , 1 , (0, ), ( , ) 0 ia i a ia ia i a ia u u iid E u π π π σ π − − = + = ∼   (6) 
Equation (6) specifies the random walk process, where the current value depends on the one 
from  the  previous  age  and  an  innovation  term  ia π ,  which  represent  white-noise  non-mean-
reverting shocks to permanent earnings. In other words,  ia π  accommodates any permanent re-
ranking of individuals in the earnings distribution. As argued by Baker (1997), the intuition for 
this model is not obvious, but the high persistency of the unit root model might result from low 
rates of depreciation on human capital investments or labour market conditions through implicit 
contacts. In this model, current earnings are a sufficient statistic for future earnings.  
Thirdly, regarding the transitory component of earnings, previous research has brought evidence 
that transitory earnings might be serially correlated. Therefore, a more general autocorrelation 
structure is called for, that relaxes the restriction on  ' it v s  from the canonical model. For the 
construction  of  such  a  structure,  longitudinal  studies  on  earnings  dynamics  turned  to  error 
processes from the literature on time series analysis. Based on MaCurdy (1982), the structure of 





, (0, ), (0, )
p q
j it j j it j it i c
j j
v iid v ε ρ θ ε ε σ σ − −
= =
= ∑ ∑ ∼ ∼ ,  (7) 
it ε  is assumed to be white noise with mean 0 and variance 
2
ε σ . The variance 
2
0,c σ   measures the 
volatility  of  shocks  at  the  start  of  the  sample  period  and 
2
ε σ   the  volatility  of  shocks  in 
subsequent  years.  j ρ   is  the  autoregressive  parameter  with  0 1 ρ = ,  which  measures  the 
persistence of shocks.  j θ  is the moving average parameter with  0 1 θ = , which accommodates 
sharp drops of the lag-j autocovariance compared with the other autocovariances. In this model, 
the autoregressive and moving average parameters are assumed to be constant over time.  
3.2. Earnings Mobility 
Another aspect relevant to the evolution of earnings differentials is earnings mobility, defined by 
Katz and Autor (1999) as the rate at which individuals shift positions in the earnings distribution. 
Earnings  mobility  is  closely  related  to  the  importance  of  the  permanent  and  transitory 
components in earnings variation. A large contribution of the permanent component implies that 
individual earnings are highly correlated over time and individuals do not change their income 
position to a large extent experiencing low rates of earnings mobility. Therefore, the changes in 
earnings mobility are determined by the extent to which changes in cross-sectional inequality are 
driven by changes in the permanent or transitory variance.  
A rise only in the permanent inequality is associated with a decline in mobility rates, whereas a 
rise only in the transitory variance is associated with an increase in mobility. Equal proportional 
increases in both components will leave mobility unchanged in spite of increasing overall cross-
sectional inequality. It becomes obvious that the question regarding the link between earnings 
mobility  and earnings  inequality does not have  a straight  forward answer. As underlined  by 
Dickens(1999), “changes in earnings mobility could either work to offset or to increase changes 
in cross-sectional dispersion”, with very different implications for permanent earnings inequality. 
Indeed,  mobility  is  beneficial  when  it  helps  low  paid  individuals  to  improve  their  income 
position in the long-term income distribution.  
In the same line of thought, an increase in cross-sectional earnings inequality is considered a 
distributional problem only if it affects negatively the economic position of people situated in the 11 
 
bottom of the earnings distribution. If earnings increase for people situated both at the bottom 
and top of the distribution, and the increase is higher at the top than at the bottom, then inequality 
increases. However, in this situation people at the bottom of the distribution are better off. If 
mean earnings increase and there are no other changes in the distribution, then less people fall 
under a  fixed poverty  line,  hence  more people  are better off. However,  if  also the  variance 
increases, then it is difficult to predict the exact outcome. Hence, the income position of the low-
wage individuals is affected by the combined effects of economic growth, change in inequality 
and mobility. (Gottschalk 1997) 
4.  DATA 
The  study  is conducted using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
1 over the 
period 1994-2001 for 14 EU countries. Not all countries are present for all waves. Luxembourg 
and  Austria  are  observed  between  1995  and  2001  and  Finland  between  1996  and  2001. 
Following the tradition of previous studies, the analysis focuses only on men.  
A  special  problem  with  panel  data  is  that  of  attrition  over  time,  as  individuals  are  lost  at 
successive  dates  causing  the  panel  to  decline  in  size  and  raising  the  problem  of 
representativeness. Several papers analysed the extent and the determinants of panel attrition in 
ECHP. Behr, Bellgardt and Rendtel (2005) found that the extent and the determinants of panel 
attrition vary between countries and across waves within one country, but these differences do 
not bias the analysis of income or the ranking of the national results. Ayala, Navrro and Sastre 
(2006)  assessed  the  effects  of  panel  attrition  on  income  mobility  comparisons  for  some  EU 
countries. The results show that ECHP attrition is characterized by a certain degree of selectivity, 
but only affecting some  variables and some countries. Moreover, income  mobility  indicators 
show certain sensitivity to the weighting system.  
In  this  paper,  the  weighting  system  applied  to  correct  for  the  attrition  bias  is  the  one 
recommended by Eurostat, namely using the “base weights” of the last wave observed for each 
                                                              
1  The  European  Community  Household  Panel  provided  by  Eurostat  via  the  Department  of 
Applied Economics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles. 12 
 
individual, bounded between 0.25 and 10. The dataset is scaled up to a multiplicative constant
2 
of the base weights of the last year observed for each individual.  
For the empirical analysis, individuals are categorized into four birth cohorts, which are followed 
through time. Ideally, one should use birth cohorts formed from people born in a particular year. 
The limited number of observations forces us to group more birth years in one cohort. The first 
birth  cohort  contains  people  born  between  1940-1950, the  second  one  people  born  between 
1951-1960, the third cohort people born between 1961-1970 and lastly people born between 
1971-1981. This grouping allows the analysis of the earnings covariance structure for individuals 
of the same age, followed at different points in time.  
For this study we use real log hourly wage adjusted for CPI of male workers aged 20 to 57, born 
between 1940 and 1981. Only observations with hourly wage lower than 50 Euros and higher 
than  1  Euro  were  considered  in  the  analysis.  The  resulting  sample  for  each  country  is  an 
unbalanced panel. The choice of using unbalanced panels for estimating the covariance structure 
of  earnings  is  motivated  by  the  need  to  mitigate  the  potential  overestimation  of  earnings 
persistence that would arise from balanced panels where the estimation is based only on people 
that have positive earnings for the entire sample period. Details on the number of observations, 
inflows and outflows of the sample by cohort over time for each country, mean yearly hourly 
earnings are provided in Table 1 and Table 2. For more descriptive statistics refer to Sologon and 
O’Donoghue (2009). Mean hourly earnings appear to increase in all countries except for Austria 
where it records a slight decrease. In general, as illustrated by Table 2 the highest attrition rates 
from one year to the next are recorded in Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, where, on 
average, less than 60% of those who were in the sample in the previous year reported positive 
earnings in the current year. 
5.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION METHOD OF COVARIANCE STRUCTURES  
The aim of this section is to fit a parsimonious model to the autocovariance structure of earnings 
for  all  cohorts  and  for  all  countries.  This  model  can  be  use  to  analyse  the  changes  in  the 
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varies across countries so that sensible samples are obtained. It ranges between 0.001-0.01. 13 
 
permanent and transitory components of earnings over the sample period and their impact on the 
overall level of earnings inequality. 
This section is structured as follows. The first one explains the econometric specification for the 
earnings model. The second and third part introduce the specification of the covariance structure 
of earnings residuals and the equally weighted minimum distance method used to fit the model to 
the covariance structure for each cohort. The forth part presents the tests used to choose between 
competing models. Lastly, we introduce the measurement for mobility. 
5.1. Econometric Earnings Specification 
In  order to  differentiate  lifecycle  dynamics  from  secular  changes  in  earnings  inequality,  the 
earnings differentials are analysed within the four cohorts defined in the previous section. The 
first step is to de-trend earnings for each cohort. The empirical specification of earnings follows 
the structure:  
, 1,..., , 1,..., ict ct ict i c Y Y r t T i N = + = =   (8) 
where  ict Y  is the natural logarithm of real hourly earnings of the i-th individual, from the c-th 
cohort  in  the  t-th  year,  ct Y is  the  year-cohort  specific  mean  and  ict r   is  an  error term  which 
represents the individual-specific deviation from the year-cohort specific mean. The demeaned 
earnings  ict r  are assumed to be independently distributed across individuals, but autocorrelated 
over  time.  Earnings  differentials  within  each  cohort  can  be  characterised  by  modelling  the 
covariance structure of individual earnings  0 ( ) ( , ), 0,..., ict ict ict s c c VarCov Y E r r s T t − = = − .
3 
This  study  approaches  the  problem  of  choosing  a  longitudinal  process  for  the  demeaned 
earnings, ict r  following the methodology used by MaCurdy(1981) and MaCurdy (1982), meaning 
in a similar manner with time series. The inspection of the covariance structure of earnings, 
which is presented in the following section, suggests the following features of the data:  
(i)  the elements of the autocovariance structure decrease with the lag at a decreasing rate and  
(ii)  they converge gradually at a positive level;  
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(iii)  the  lag-1  autocovariance  drops  to  a  larger  extent  compared  with  higher  order 
autocovariances, which decline more gradually;  
(iv)  the autocovariances and mean earnings vary over the sample period, so they cannot be 
assumed to be stationary over sample period;  
(v)  the autocovariances vary with age controlling for the period effect, hence they cannot be 
assumed to be stationary over the life cycle;  
(vi)  the variance covariance structure appears to be cohort specific. 
Each of these features are incorporated in our model. Feature (i) suggests the presence of an 
AR(1)  process,  but  the  presence  of  feature  (iii)  calls  for  a  more  complex  ARMA  (1,  1)  or 
ARMA(1, 2) process. Feature (ii) can be captured by the presence of the permanent component. 
Feature (vi) is captured by incorporating period specific parameters, meaning that the permanent 
individual component and the transitory component of earnings are allowed to vary with time. 
The life cycle non-stationarity of the autocovariance structure of earnings mentioned in feature 
(v) can be captured by modelling the permanent individual component as random walk and/or 
random  growth  in  age.  Cohort  heterogeneity  is  incorporate  by  parameters  that  allow  the 
permanent and transitory components to vary between cohorts. 
The idea is to start with a broad class of models for  ict r  and employ preliminary data analysis 
procedures to choose among competing specifications. In this way one avoids choosing a model 
specification  that  is  broadly  inconsistent  with  the  data.  The  following  general  specification 
encompasses all the relevant aspects of earnings dynamics considered above.  
 
1 1 2 2
2 2
[ ]
(0, ), (0, ), ( , )
ict ct ict c t i i it iat c t it
i i i i
Y Y r age u v
iid iid E µ ϕ µϕ
γ λ µ ϕ γ λ
µ σ ϕ σ µ ϕ σ
− = = + + +
= ∼ ∼
  (9) 
 
2
, 1, 1 , 1, 1 , (0, ), ( , ) 0 iat i a t ia ia i a t iat u u iid E u π π π σ π − − − − = + = ∼   (10) 
 
2 2
1 1 0 0, , (0, ), (0, ) it it it it it i c v v v ε ρ ε θε ε σ σ − − = + + ∼ ∼   (11) 
Based  on  equation  (9),  earnings  can  be  decomposed  into  a  permanent  component 
1 1 [ ] c t i i it iat age u γ λ µ ϕ + +  and a transitory component  2 2 c t it v γ λ . The component  i i it age µ ϕ +  models 15 
 
an individual profile heterogeneity as a function of age, called also a random growth (see (Baker 
1997), (Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995)), where  i µ  and  i ϕ  are time invariant individual intercept 
and slopes with variance 
2
µ σ  and
2
ϕ σ . Besides the random vector of intercepts and slopes       ( , ) i i µ ϕ
, the parameterization of  individual earnings dynamics  includes also a random walk process 
(Equation (10)). (Moffit and Gottschalk (1995), Baker and Solon (2003)) The variance of the 
first period shock (assumed to be at age 20, which is also the lowest age observed in our dataset) 
is estimated together with the 
2
µ σ
 and is considered part of the unobserved heterogeneity. 
Equation (11) specifies the transitory component of earnings which evolves as an ARMA(1,1) 
process, where the serial correlation  ρ parameter captures the decreasing rate of decay of the 
covariances with the lag, the moving-average parameter θ  captures the sharp drop of the lag-1 
autocovariance compared with the other autocovariances, and  it ε  are white-noise mean-reverting 
transitory shocks. The variance 
2
0,c σ   measures the volatility of shocks at the start of the sample 
period, 
2
ε σ   the  volatility  of  shocks  in  subsequent  years  and    the  persistence  of  shocks. 
Measurement error in this model is captured by this transitory component. 
The non-stationary pattern of earnings is accommodated using time specific loading factors, both 
on the permanent and transitory component of earnings,  , 1,2; 0,7 kt k t λ = = , normalized to 1 in the first 
wave for identification
4. Cohort heterogeneity is accommodated by allowing both the permanent 
and the transitory component to vary with the cohort.  , 1,2 jc j γ =  are cohort loading factor, 
normalized to 1 for the cohort born in 1940-1949 for identification. 
5.2.Specification of the Covariance Structure of Earnings  
When  working  with  ARMA(p,q)  processes  in  the  context  of  panel  data,  MaCurdy  (1981), 
MaCurdy (1982) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) underlined the need for a treatment of initial 
conditions
5.  As  illustrated  in  equations  (13)  and  (14),  the  autoregressive  process  induces  a 
recursive structure in the moments: the variance-covariance in year t depends on the transitory 
                                                              
41994 refers to t=0 
5 See Macurdy(1982, page 92/93) 16 
 
variance-covariance in year t-1. If one tracks the recursion back to the first sample year for each 
cohort, this raises the question of what is the transitory variance for each cohort in that year. In 
the earlier stage of the literature on earnings dynamics, it was common to restrict the initial 
transitory variance to be the same for all cohorts. In line, with the most recent literature on 
earnings  dynamics,  our  model  acknowledges  that  earnings  volatility  varies  across  cohorts 
because they illustrate different stages of the lifecycle and have experienced different period 
effects, therefore such a strong assumption is untenable.  
Following MaCurdy (1981), MaCurdy (1982), we treat the initial transitory variances of the 4 
cohorts as 4 additional parameters to be estimated. The complete specification of the covariance 
structure of earnings is included in Annex 10.1. The covariance structure for the first sample 
period takes the form: 
2 2 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2cov( ) ( ) ( 20) ( ) 0 ic ic ic i i i i i Var Y E r r E age E age a Var v if t µ ϕ π σ σ µϕ σ = = + + + − + =  (12) 
The covariance structure for subsequent years can be expressed as follows: 
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1
( ) ( ) [ ( ) 2cov( ) ( ) ( 20)]
[ ( ) (1 2 )] 0
ict ict ict c t it i i it
c t it
Var Y E r r E age E age a
Var v if t
µ ϕ π
ε
γ λ σ σ µϕ σ
γ λ ρ σ ρθ θ −
= = + + + − +
+ + + + >
  (13) 
2 2 2 2 2
1 1
2
2 2 2 1
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  (14) 
1 1
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
2 2 2 1 1
( ) ( )
{ ( ) ( ) cov( )[ ( ) ( )] ( 1 20)}
{ ( ) )} 0 & 1
ict ict ict ict
c t it it i i it it
c t t it
Cov Y Y E r r
E age E age E age E age a
Var v if t s
µ ϕ π
ε
γ λ σ σ µϕ σ





= + + + + − −
+ + > =
  (15) 
The  degree  of  immobility  is  measured  by  the  ratio  between  the  permanent  and  transitory 
variance.  
5.3. Estimation of Covariance Structures 
Covariance  structures  are  models  that  specify  a  structure  for  the  covariance  matrix  of  the 
regression error. They can be used to model structures for error dynamics and  measurement 
error. The  goal  is  to  estimate  the  parameters  of  the  covariance  structure of  earnings  for  all 17 
 
cohorts. This can be used to analyse the changes in the permanent and transitory components of 
earnings over the sample period.  
The parameters of the models are fit to the covariance structure for each cohort using equally 
weighted minimum distance methods of estimation. The methodology used is the same as that 
utilized  by  Cappellari  (2003),  Baker  and  Solon  (2003),  Ramos  (2003),  Kalwij  and  Alessie 
(2003),  Dickens  (2000),  Baker  (1997),  Abowd  and  Card  (1989),  Cervini  and  Ramos  (2006) 
adapted to unbalanced panels.  
For  each  cohort    and  individual   , ,, ,  define  a  vector  which  identifies  the  presence  for  each 

















where  ict d  is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the individual from cohort c is present in 
year t of the panel and  c t is the total length of the panel for each cohort. Similarly, the vector 

















where  ict r  are the earnings residuals for individual i belonging to cohort c, in year t in mean 
deviation form for each cohort and year. The elements of the  ic R  corresponding to missing years 
are set to 0. The variance-covariance matrix of the earnings is computed separately for each 
cohort, c C .  The  elements  of  the  variance-covariance  matrix  for  cohort  c,  c C ,  which  is  of 
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where  c n  is the total number of individuals in cohort c,  , {1,..., } c k l t = . Conformably with  c m , 
ci m   represent  the  distinct  elements  of  the  individual  cross-product  matrix 
'























c c t t +
×  distinct elements. Let  c Vech(C )be a column 




c c t t +
×   which  stacks  all  the  elements  of  the  variance  covariance 
matrix  c C   for  cohort  c.  The  aggregate  vector  of  moments  for  all  cohorts  is  denoted  by: 
T T T
1 4 m = (Vech(C ) ,...,Vech(C ) ) , 











× ∑ . In this paper, each cohort is observed 
between 1994 and 2001, therefore  8 c t = . Since the individuals were grouped in four cohorts, m
is a column vector of dimension (144 1) × . 
To estimate the error components of the structural model illustrated by equations (9), (10) and 
(11), the elements of m are fit to a parameter vector θ , so that        ( ) f = m θ ,  ( ) f θ  takes the form 
of equations (13), (14), (15) and (12). Minimum distance estimation requires minimising the 
weighted sum of the squared distance between the actual covariances (m) and a function of the 
parameter  vector  ( ( ) f θ )  which  encapsulates  the  covariance  structure  implied  by  the  error 
component  model.  Therefore,  minimum  distance  estimation  involves  the  following  quadratic 
form: ( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]' D f f = − − θ m θ Wm θ ,  where  W is  a  positive  definite  weighting  matrix. 
Minimum distance estimator chooses  ￿ θ  to minimise the distance function  ￿ ( ) D θ . 
Based on Chamberlain (1984), the asymptotic optimal choice of  W  is the inverse of a matrix 
that consistently estimates the covariance matrix of  m, which leads to the optimum minimum 
distance estimator (OMD). However, Clark (1996) and Altonji and Segal (1994) provided Monte 
Carlo evidence that OMD is biased in small samples because of the correlation between the 
measurement error in the second moments and forth moments. Instead, they proposed using the 
identity matrix as a weighting matrix. This approach, often called “equally weighted minimum 19 
 
distance estimation” (EWMD), involves using the standard nonlinear least squares to fit  ( ) f θ  to
m. The same procedure is followed in this paper.  
For estimating the asymptotic standard errors of the parameter estimates, we apply the delta 
method.  Following  Chamberlain  (1984),  the  asymptotic  variance-covariance  matrix  of  the 
estimated parameters is obtained from the following formula: 
-1 -1 AsyVar(θ) = (G'WG) G' ' WVWG(G WG)  (17) 
where  G   is the  Jacobian of the transformation  ( ) f θ  evaluated at  ￿ = θ θ.  G  has dimension 




c c t t +
×  and p is the number of 
parameters. W  is the identity matrix and V the matrix of fourth sample moments.  
Chamberlain  (1984)  showed  that  under  some  fairly  general  regularity  assumptions,  the 
independence of  ic R  implies that the sample mean of  ci m  has an asymptotic normal distribution 
* * ( , ) c c c m N m V ∼ , where 
*
c m  is the expectation of  ci m , meaning the true covariance matrix of 
earnings, and 
*
c V   is the  variance-covariance  matrix, which can  be estimated consistently  by 
computing the sample moment matrix of the  c Vech(C ) vector,  c V . The elements of the variance 
covariance  c V  can be written as follows: 
1
1 1
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The variance-covariance matrix of m was denoted by  V , where  V is the block diagonal matrix 
which is constructed from all the  c V  matrices.  
5.4. Strategy for model specification 
The chi-squared goodness of fit statistic is computed following Newey(1985):  
￿ ￿ [ ( )] [ ( )]' f f χ = − −
-1 m θ R m θ  20 
 












− = − ∑ ,  =
-1 -1 R (WVW')  and 
-1 W = I-G(G AG) ' G'A. The majority of the 
existing  studies  estimating  the  covariance  structure  of  earnings  used  this  general  form  of 
specification test to assess the goodness of fit of the model. However, in most cases, all models 
have been rejected. Baker and Solon (2003), Baker (1997), Leamer (1983) criticized these type 
of tests for several reasons. First, Baker and Solon (2003) and Leamer (1983) underlined that 
“diagnostic tests such as goodness-of-fit tests, without explicit alternative hypothesis, are useless, 
since if the sample size is large enough, any maintained hypothesis will be rejected. Such tests 
therefore degenerate into elaborate rituals for measuring the effective sample size.” Second, as 
pointed by Baker and Solon (2003), an additional problem is that these specification tests have 
inflated  size  in  small  samples  and  the  inflation  is  positively  related  with  the  number  of 
overidentifying restrictions. For example, Baker (1997) revealed through a Monte Carlo study, 
that for a test with fewer than 150 overidentifying restrictions, the critical values are 40%-50% 
greater than the critical values based on the asymptotic theory. Therefore, we decided to report 
this statistic as a reference, but not to use it to assess the goodness of fit of our model. Instead we 
employed the SSR as a measure of fit. 
To test between nested models, we could use Preposition 3’ in Chamberlain (1984) or the LR 
test. Based on Preposition 3’ in Chamberlain (1984), assuming that the general model has p 
parameters, to test between two nested models, one in which  1 k  parameters are restricted to 0 (
1 p k χ − ) and one in which 2 k
6 parameters are restricted to 0 (
2 p k χ − ), Chamberlain (1984) showed 
that the incremental chi square statistic 
1 2 p k p k χ χ χ − − = −  follows a chi-squared distribution with       






= . Under the 
null  hypothesis,  LR  is  follows  a  chi-square  distribution  with  d.o.f  equal  to  the  number  of 
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The smaller the value of BIC and AIC are the better the fit is. The difference between the two is 
that BIC incorporates a higher penalty for additional parameters than AIC and is recommended 
as the first choice.  
6.  THE DYNAMIC AUTOCOVARIANCE STRUCTURE OF HOURLY EARNINGS 
To begin with, it is informative to have a description of the dynamic structure of individual log 
hourly earnings for all 14 countries under analysis. The autocovariance structure of earnings is 
computed for each cohort separately, as well as overall, using formula (16) introduced in the 
previous  section.  The  overall  autocovariance  structure  of  earnings  is  displayed  in  Figure  1, 
whereas the structure by cohort is included in Figure 2. The model used to fit the autocovariance 
structure of earnings for all cohorts must be consistent with the trends observed in the dynamic 
autocovariance structure. 
The overall autocovariance structure of earnings displays both similar and diverging patterns 
across countries. In the beginning of the sample period, the overall inequality appears to be the 
highest in Portugal, followed by Ireland, Spain, France, Luxembourg, UK, Greece, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland and Denmark. In 2001, Portugal still records the 
highest  inequality,  followed  by  Luxembourg,  France,  Greece,  Spain,  UK,  Italy,  Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Austria and Denmark.  
The general picture is that the variance of  log  hourly  earnings appears to decrease over the 
sample  period  in  Germany,  Denmark,  Belgium,  France,  UK,  Ireland,  Spain  and  Austria,  to 
increase in Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal and Finland. The purpose of this paper is 
to decompose the  variance  for each country  into the permanent and transitory  variance, and 
conclude which of these components were the main factors triggering the evolution of overall 
inequality over time. 
The common pattern across all countries is that all lags autocovariances show in general similar 
pattern as the variance. They are positive and quite large in magnitude relative to the variances. 
The distance between autocovariances at consecutive lags falls at a decreasing rate. The biggest 
fall is registered by the lag-1 autocovariance, after which the covariances appear to converge 
gradually at a positive level. Variances reflect both the permanent and the transitory components 
of  earnings,  whereas  higher  order  covariances  reflect the  permanent  component of  earnings. 22 
 
Therefore, the evolution of the covariances, at all orders, suggests the presence of a permanent 
individual  component  of  wages  and  a  transitory  component  which  is  serially  correlated. 
Moreover, the sharp decline of the first lag autocovariance is consistent with the presence of a 
moving average process of first order.  
Both  mean earnings  and all  lags  autocovariances  vary over time, which provide a  first sign 
suggesting the presence of nonstationarity in the dynamic structure of earnings.  
In all countries, the autocovariances display different patterns across cohorts, supporting the 
hypothesis of cohort heterogeneity with respect to individual earnings dynamics. The general 
picture is that, in all countries, the variance for all cohorts appears to follow the evolution of the 
overall  variance,  but  the  evolution  is  not  monotonic  and  the  rate  of  change  differs  among 
cohorts. In general, in countries that record a decrease in the variance, the older the cohort, the 
steeper the decrease. For those that record an increase in the variance over time, the older the 
cohort,  the  steeper  the  increase  is.  Moreover,  the  younger  the  cohort  is  the  lower  the 
autocovariances  are.  Hence,  given  that  higher  order  autocovariances  capture  the  permanent 
component of earnings, it is reasonable to expect that in all countries, for younger cohorts, the 
transitory variance plays a larger role in the earnings formation than the permanent component 
compared with older cohorts.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, for all cohorts, all lags autocovariances show in general similar pattern 
as the variance, in line with the overall pattern. The evolution of the covariances, at all orders, 
suggests the presence of a permanent individual component of wages and a transitory component 
which  is  serially  correlated.  Moreover,  the  sharp  decline  of  the  first  lag  autocovariance  is 
consistent with the presence of a moving average process of first order. Similar with the overall 
trend, there is evidence of nonstationarity in the dynamic structure of earnings by cohort. 
To look at these lifecycle effects more clearly, it is necessary to remove the time effect that is 
present  in  these  within  cohort  autocovariances.  For  the  figures  illustrating  lifecycle 
autocovariances  refer  to  Sologon  and  O'Donoghue  (2009).  In  all  countries,  all  lags 
autocovariances of log real gross hourly earnings show a similar pattern as the variance. They are 
positive and evolve parallel with the variance, at different rates over the life cycle. They rise 
sharply over the life cycle until the late 30s and early 40s, after which they have a rather stable 23 
 
evolution  up  until  late  50s,  when  more  noise  can  be  observed  in  the  variance-covariance 
structure. The diminishing rate of increase of all lags autocovariances, which characterizes the 
life cycle from the age of 20 until the late 50s, is consistent with the presence of a permanent 
component of earnings that rises with age at a diminishing rate. (Dickens, 2000) Moreover, the 
autocovariances display a noisy evolution over the lifecycle which increases with age, which 
might suggest also the presence of a random walk in age.  
Comparing  across  years,  the  life  cycle  profile  of  the  auto-covariances  of  log  gross  hourly 
earnings appears to become steeper over time in France, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Finland. The slope of the life cycle profile can be interpreted as the returns to the 
permanent component of earnings, therefore steeper slopes in later years imply increasing returns 
to the permanent component of earnings over time. 
To sum up, the description of the dynamic structure of individual earnings for men suggests five 
main features of the data, which were incorporated in our model, as mentioned previously: 
•  First, the covariance elements are not the same at all lags. They decrease with the lag at a 
decreasing  rate  and  converge  gradually  at  a  positive  level,  suggesting  the  presence  of  a 
transitory element, which is serially correlated, and of a permanent individual component of 
earnings. The most popular specification for the serially correlated term is the AR(1) process. 
However, the fact that the lag-1 autocovariance drops to a larger extent compared with the 
other autocovariances and that the autocovariances at high orders decline very slowly suggest 
that earnings cannot be modelled simply as a first-order autoregressive process. Therefore a 
more complex ARMA (p, q) process might be a better choice, where p represents the order of 
the autoregressive process and q the order of the moving average process.  
•  Second, as the autocovariances and mean earnings vary over the sample period, they cannot 
be assumed to be stationary over sample period. The stationarity assumption was tested and 
rejected using the methodology introduced by  MaCurdy (1982). One way to capture this 
feature is to incorporate period specific parameters, meaning that the permanent individual 
component and the transitory component of earnings are allowed to vary with time.  
•  Third, as autocovariances  vary with age controlling  for the period effect, they cannot be 
assumed  to  be  stationary  over  the  life  cycle.  This  non-stationarity  can  be  captured  by 24 
 
modelling the permanent individual component as random walk and/or random growth in 
age.  
•  Lastly,  the  variance  covariance  structure  appears  to  be  cohort  specific,  which  can  be 
incorporated  by  parameters  that  allow  the  permanent  and  transitory  components  to  vary 
between cohorts.  
7.  RESULTS OF COVARIANCE STRUCTURE ESTIMATION 
7.1. Error component model estimation results 
The  general  specification  of  the  error  component  model  outlined  in  section  5.2,  which 
encompasses all relevant aspects of earnings dynamics considered above, is fit to the elements of 
the covariance matrix of each country, for all cohorts pooled together
7. For choosing the best 
model  for  each  country  we  followed  a  general  to  specific  strategy,  by  imposing  additional 
restrictions on the general model. The estimation of the general model which incorporates both 
the random growth and the random walk specifications in the permanent component had some 
identification problems in all countries. The ARMA process was found only in three countries 
and homogenous initial conditions only in four. In all countries, the models incorporating both 
time and cohort shifters performed the best.  
We present the parameter estimates only for the models that fit data the best for each country. 
The estimation results are illustrated in Table 3. Similar to Dickens (2000), all variances are 
restricted to be positive by estimating the variance equal to the exponent of the parameter. The 
reported variance estimates represent the exponent of the parameter and the reported standard 
errors correspond to the parameter estimates. 
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Permanent component 
In  Germany,  Netherlands,  UK,  Ireland,  Italy,  Greece,  Spain  and  Finland,  the  permanent 
component follows a random growth model with time and cohort specific loading factors. The 
estimated  coefficients  for  the  permanent  component  of  earnings  show  that  time-invariant 
heterogeneity and age-earning profile heterogeneity plays a significant role in the formation of 
long-term earnings differentials in all these countries. Individual specific heterogeneity plays the 
highest role in Germany, followed by Spain, Netherlands, Greece, UK, Ireland and Italy, which 
suggests that in Germany there is a higher dispersion in the time-invariant individual specific 
attributes that determine wage differentials. 
The  estimated  random  slope  variance  implies  that  hourly  earnings  growth  for  an  individual 
located one standard deviation above the mean in the distribution of φ is the largest in Germany, 
where  it  is  with  4.89%
8  faster  than  the  cohort  mean,  followed  by  Greece,  Ireland,  Spain, 
Netherlands, UK and Finland with rates between 1% and 1.41% and Italy with 0.89%. All these 
countries have a negative covariance between the time invariant individual specific effect and the 
individual specific slope of the age-earning profile, which implies that the initial and lifecycle 
heterogeneity are negatively associated. This negative association corresponds to the trade-off 
between earnings early in the career and subsequent earnings growth and is consistent with the 
on-the-job training hypothesis (Mincer, 1974). Therefore, this suggests the presence of mobility 
within the distribution of permanent earnings over the sample period. These findings reinforce 
the results from previous studies.  
Therefore for these countries the evolution of the permanent component without the time loading 
factors  could  be  either  increasing  or  decreasing.  The  time-specific  loading  factors  for  the 
permanent component are highly significant with values close to 1 in all countries. The trends of 
the returns to the permanent component vary to a large extent across countries. One common 
feature is that they reflect, as was emphasized before, trends in the high-order autocovariances in 
the data. These estimates show that overall, controlling for age and cohort effects, the returns to 
skills decreased over the sample period in Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and 
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increased in Germany and Finland. The trends over one year intervals differ between countries, 
some  records  a  smooth  evolution,  others  noisier.  For  example,  Netherlands  experienced 
decreases in returns almost every second year. In UK, the returns increased in 1997 and 2001 and 
decreased in the rest. Ireland recorded a decrease until 1996, a boost in 1997 and a clear decline 
thereafter. In Italy, 1998 and 1999 appear to be years with increases in return to skills, in Greece 
every second year, in Spain 1996 and 1998. Germany experienced increasing returns to human 
capital until 2000, and Finland in 1997 and 2001. Therefore, in these years, the relative position 
of the highly skilled individuals was enhanced.  
In  Denmark  the  permanent  component  follows  a  random  walk  in  age.  The  variance  of  the 
innovation in the random walk is significantly larger than zero. As the variance of a variable that 
follows a random walk is the sum of the variances of the innovation term, this finding implies 
that permanent inequality increases over lifetime. In Denmark, the variance at the age of 20 is 
higher than the variance at subsequent ages, suggesting the presence of larger permanent shocks 
at younger ages, which is consistent with matching models, in which the information revealed 
about a worker’s ability increases with time. The final trend in the permanent variance depends 
on the period specific  loading  factors, which reveal that overall, the relative position of the 
highly skilled individuals decreased over the sample period in Denmark. The yearly evolution 
revealed a smooth decrease until 2000, followed by a small increase in 2001. 
In Belgium,  France,  Luxembourg, Portugal and  Austria the persistent dispersion of earnings 
follows the canonical  model, where the permanent component  is time-invariant. The highest 
variance  in  the  time  invariant  characteristics  is  recorded  in  Portugal,  followed  by  France, 
Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium. In this case, the time-specific loading factors determine the 
final trend of the permanent differentials: they decreased in Belgium and Austria, and increased 
in France, Luxembourg and Portugal. With respect to the yearly evolution, France records an 
increase in the returns to skills until 1997 and again in 2001, Luxembourg until 2000, Belgium in 
1995 and 2001, Austria during most of the period, except 1998-1999, and Portugal in 1996 and 
1998. 
The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the permanent earnings are highly significant in 
all countries. However, the trends suggested by these estimates differ between countries. The 
permanent component of earnings appears to increase over the life cycle in Germany, France, 27 
 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Austria. In Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and Spain the permanent 
component  of  earnings  has  an  inverted-U  shape  evolution  over  the  life  cycle.  These  trends 
confirm the expectation that permanent earnings differentials play  a  much  larger role  in the 
formation of overall earnings differentials of older cohorts compared with younger ones, which 
experience higher earnings volatility due to temporary contracts. We expect the opposite to hold 
in the case of cohort-specific shifters for transitory earnings.  
The permanent component of earnings appears to decrease over the life cycle in UK, Ireland, 
Italy,  Greece  and  Finland.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  younger  cohorts  have  more 
heterogeneous  skills.  Another  explanation  is  that  younger  cohorts  might  experience  larger 
permanent shocks even if they do not have a larger dispersion of skills. This could be the case if 
the labour market has become tougher over time, such as in the case of the Italian labour market, 
which is characterised by high rates of youth unemployment.  
Temporary component 
The formulation of the temporary component of earnings differs between countries. It follows an 
AR(1) process with time and cohorts loading factors in all countries, except for Italy, Greece and 
Spain,  where  it  follows  an  ARMA(1,1).  Except  for  Spain,  Portugal  and  Austria,  where  all 
cohorts share the same initial conditions, the other countries are characterized by heteroskedastic 
initial conditions. The estimated coefficients for the transitory component of earnings are all 
significant,  suggesting  that  the  initial  variance(s),  the  AR(1)  process,  respectively  the 
ARMA(1,1) process and the time and cohort loading factors contribute significantly to earnings 
volatility in all countries.  
The variance of initial conditions, which represents the accumulation of shocks up to the starting 
year of the panel, is smaller than that of subsequent shocks in all countries. However, the pattern 
of the heteroskedstic initial conditions differs between countries. In Denmark, Luxembourg, UK, 
Ireland,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Finland  it  follows  the  inverted-U  shape:  the  variance  of  initial 
conditions increases over the lifecycle and decreases at the end. The opposite holds for France, 
where the oldest and the youngest cohorts have the highest initial variances.  
In Germany, Netherlands, France and Finland the pattern of the heteroskedstic initial conditions 
illustrates a general decreasing trend over the lifecycle, suggesting that the initial variance plays 28 
 
a larger role in the formation of earnings differentials for the youngest cohort compared with the 
oldest. In Belgium the reverse holds: the heteroskedastic cohort initial conditions appear to play 
the largest role in the formation of earnings differentials for the oldest cohort and the smallest for 
the youngest cohort.  
The magnitude of the autoregressive parameter varies between countries. A large autoregressive 
parameter, which suggests that shocks are persistent, is recorded in Spain with 26.9% of a shock 
still  present  after  8  years,  in  Portugal  with  8.5%  and  in  Austria  with  5.7%.  A  moderate 
autoregressive parameter suggesting that shocks die out rather quickly is recorded in Italy with 
2.8% of a shock still present after 8 years, in Belgium with 2.4%, and in Greece with 1.4%. A 
very small autoregressive parameter is present in Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland, Netherlands, 
Germany,  France,  UK  and  Denmark,  where  between  0.0008%  and  0.8%  of  a  shock  is  still 
present after 8 years. The negative sign of the MA component implies that the autocovariances 
decline sharply over the first period, confirming the trends observed in the previous section for 
Italy, Greece and Spain.
9 
The time-specific loading factors for the transitory component are highly significant and display 
a higher variation than for the permanent component in all countries. The trends of the transitory 
inequality vary to a large extent across countries. These estimates show that overall the transitory 
variance decreased over the sample period in Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
UK, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland. It increased in Luxembourg and Ireland.  
The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the transitory earnings are highly significant in 
all countries. The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the temporary component indicate 
that earnings volatility appears to be higher for younger cohorts, thus confirming the pattern 
observed  in  the  dynamic  description  of  the  autocovariance  structure  of  earnings,  where 
autocovariances were found to be lower for younger cohorts. This result is expected, given that 
younger people experience in general more frequent job changes, and consequently less stable 
earnings.  
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Alternative model specifications 
Table 4 introduces the alternative model specifications for each country to justify the choice for 
the  preferred  models.  Through  these  models,  we  tested  whether  the  restrictions  imposed  by 
previous studies hold for each country.  
First  compared  with  the  simple  canonical  model,  our  country-models  revealed  a  significant 
improvement, both with respect to SSR and the Newey chi-squared goodness of fit. Moreover, 
the overall Wald test showed that, for each country, the restrictions imposed by the canonical 
model do not hold  in the data. In Germany, assuming away the restrictions  imposed by the 
canonical model decreased the 
2 χ .with 46764.97at a cost of 26 degrees of freedom. Similarly, in 
Denmark  the  decrease  in 
2 χ was  of  23505.49,  in  Netherlands  of  21880.65,  in  Belgium  of 
28937.06, in France of 6602.395, in Luxembourg of 33598.94, in UK of 9651.35, in Ireland of 
22338.56, in Italy of 10858.77, in Greece of 23150.67, in Spain of 9833.018, in Portugal of 
35182.5, in Austria of 12829.92 and in Finland of 5733.26. We then tested these restrictions in 
turn. 
If we assume away the random growth in the permanent component (
2 0 ϕ σ =  and cov( , ) 0 µ ϕ = ), 
the Wald test on this restrictions clearly rejects the null in Germany (
2   859.6255 χ = , df=2), 
Netherlands  (
2 178.7331 χ = ,  df=3),  UK  (
2 185.2973 χ = ,  df=2),  Ireland  (
2 8.8093 χ = ,  df=2), 
Italy  (
2 65.2755 χ = ,  df=2),  Spain  (
2 28.2711 χ = ,  df=2),  Finland  (
2 99.2208 χ = ,  df=2).  In 
Greece,  this  assumption  leads  to  an  unidentified  model.  Identification  problems  from 
incorporating  a  random  growth  are  found  in  Belgium,  France,  Luxembourg,  Portugal  and 
Austria. 
Incorporating a random walk in the permanent component leaded to identification problems in 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Austria. Based on the Wald test, in Portugal and Denmark, 
the random walk was rejected by the data. However, in Denmark, given that the random walk 
was highly significant and the SSR is lower than without the random walk, we decided to keep it. 
Among the countries that favoured the random growth, the random walk either triggered some 
identification problems or a higher BIC than the model incorporating a random growth.  30 
 
Based  on  Wald  test,  the  restriction  of  homogenous  initial  conditions  (
2 2 2 2 2
0 0,40 50 0,51 60 0,61 70 0,71 80 σ σ σ σ σ − − − − = = = = )  was  rejected  in  Germany  (
2 125.1595 χ = ,  df=5), 
Denmark (
2 436.3263 χ = , df=3), Netherlands (
2 207.3169 χ = , df=3), Belgium (
2 1063.161 χ = , 
df=3), France (
2 61.0812 χ = , df=3), Luxembourg ((
2 268.491 χ = , df=3), Ireland (
2 8.8093 χ = , 
df=2), Italy (
2 70.1507 χ = , df=3) and Greece (
2 172.1103 χ = , df=3). Assuming heterogeneous 
initial conditions worsened the fit of the model in Portugal and Austria, as illustrated by the 
increase of 11613.2, respectively 152.77  in 
2 χ . Similarly was obtained  in  Finland, however 
given that in our preferred model the SSR is smaller and the parameter estimates are significant, 
we  decided  to  keep  the  specification.  Assuming  heterogenous  initial  conditions  leaded  to 
convergence or identification problems in UK and Spain. 
Introducing an MA(1) component besides the AR(1) improved significantly the fit of the model 
in Italy (
2 323.1314 χ = , df=1), Greece (
2 121.2267 χ = , df=1) and Spain (
2 47.9717 χ = , df=1). 
MA(1) component was rejected in Luxembourg and Portugal, as suggested by the increase of 
1.073, respectively 4015.76 in 
2 χ . In rest, this specification failed to converge or suffered from 
identification problems.  
8.  INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION INTO PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY INEQUALITY 
8.1.Absolute Decomposition 
Having estimated a suitable error component model for earnings in each country, next we use 
these parameters estimates to decompose the variance-covariance structure of earnings into its 
permanent  and  transitory  components,  assess  their  relative  importance  and  analyse  their 
contribution to the evolution of the overall inequality over the sample period. Basically, we want 
to assess which is the component that plays the largest role in the declining/rising overall cross-
sectional inequality between 1994 and 2001.  
The decomposition of the variance, together with the actual and predicted variance of earnings 
by cohort are presented  in Figure 3. A summary of the evolution of the two components  is 
offered in Figure 4 which illustrates the degree of immobility, measured as the ratio between the 
average permanent variance across cohorts and the average transitory variance across cohorts.  31 
 
For all countries, the evolution of the predicted variance follows closely the evolution of the 
actual variance, which is not surprising given the high fit of the models indicated by the very low 
sum of square residuals. Earnings inequality measured by the actual variance decreased overall 
in Germany, except for the cohorts born in 1941-1950 and 1961-1970 where it increased; in 
Denmark; in Belgium, except for the youngest cohort where it increased; in France, except for 
the cohort born in 1961-1970; in UK, except for the youngest two cohorts where it increased; in 
Ireland; in Spain except the youngest cohort, and in Austria. Earnings inequality measured by the 
actual  variance  increased  overall  for  all  cohorts  in  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Italy,  Greece, 
Portugal and Finland, except the youngest cohort. These are countries where wages appear to be 
more responsive to market forces.  
In 1994, the  highest permanent  inequality was recorded  in Portugal and Spain,  followed  by 
France, Ireland, Germany, UK, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. The highest 
transitory variance was recorded in France, Ireland, Greece, UK, Germany, Spain, Denmark, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Portugal. The rankings in immobility reveal that Denmark was 
the  most  mobile,  followed  by  Greece,  Belgium,  France,  Netherlands,  Ireland,  Italy,  UK, 
Germany, Spain and Portugal.  
In  2001  the  rankings  looks  slightly  different.  Portugal  records  the  highest  permanent 
differentials,  followed  by  Luxembourg,  France,  Spain,  Ireland,  Germany,  Greece,  UK,  Italy, 
Finland, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Denmark. In terms of transitory inequality, Portugal 
appears  to  be  the  most  dispersed,  followed  by  Spain,  Netherlands,  France,  Greece,  UK, 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Italy. Denmark has 
still the highest earnings mobility, followed by Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Greece, 
Finland, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg. As expected, countries 
with the lowest mobility are among the countries with the highest permanent differentials. 
The decrease in cross-sectional inequality was accompanied by a decrease in the importance of 
the permanent component relative to the transitory component, and consequently an increase in 
mobility  in  Denmark,  Belgium  and  Spain.(Figure  4)  Among  the  three,  Spain  is  the  most 
immobile, which is consistent with the fact that Spain is characterised by a degree of permanent 
inequality  more  than  twice  the  value  for the  other  two  countries,  and  a  higher  share  of  the 
permanent component. In Denmark, the decrease in cross-sectional inequality appears to be the 32 
 
result of decreasing both permanent and transitory differentials, whereas in Belgium and Spain, 
the  decrease  in  cross-sectional  inequality  appears  to  be  determined  by  a  decrease  in  the 
permanent variance, which offset the increase in the transitory variance. (Figure 3) 
Hence, the increase in mobility helped individuals improve their position in permanent earnings 
distribution and consequently reduced overall inequality.  
In Germany, France, UK, Ireland and Austria, the decrease in cross-sectional inequality was 
accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  importance  of  the  permanent  component  relative  to  the 
transitory component, and therefore a decrease in earnings mobility.(Figure 4) Thus, in these 
countries, mobility cannot be considered the driving force for the decrease in overall inequality.  
In Germany, France, UK and Ireland, the decrease in the overall inequality was the result of an 
increase in permanent differentials and a decrease in transitory differentials, whereas in Austria 
both components decreased. Different trends are observed by cohorts. (Figure 3) 
The  increase  in  cross-sectional  inequality  was  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  mobility  in 
Netherlands and by a decrease in mobility in Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Finland. 
(Figure 4)  
In  Netherlands  the  increase  in  overall  inequality  was  the  result  of  an  increase  in  both 
components. (Figure 3) Transitory inequality was exacerbated over time for all cohorts, whereas 
the trends  in the permanent  inequality differ to a  large extent between cohorts. In this case, 
mobility actually exacerbates overall cross-sectional  inequality, suggesting an  increase  in the 
earnings volatility.  
In Luxembourg, Italy, Greece and Finland the increase in the overall cross-sectional inequality 
appears to be the result of an  increase  in permanent  inequality which offset the decrease  in 
transitory inequality. (Figure 3) Therefore the exacerbation of permanent differentials, meaning 
the increase in returns to skills was the dominant factor behind the increase in overall inequality. 
In Portugal, both components increased over time, the permanent component at a higher rate than 
the transitory component. 
8.2.Relative decomposition 
Figure 5 illustrates the relative decomposition of the overall predicted variance of earnings into 
its permanent and transitory components. The pattern of decomposition of the overall variance 33 
 
varies between cohorts and countries. However, some common traits emerge. Inequality in the 
permanent component of earnings appears to account for a higher share of the overall variance 
the older the cohort is, which is consistent with the evidence of lifecycle earnings divergence 
showing  that  older  cohorts  experience  a  lower  earnings  volatility  compared  with  younger 
cohorts. Moreover, inequality in the temporary component of earnings accounts for the highest 
share for the youngest cohort, which reinforces the expectation that earnings volatility is higher 
at younger ages. 
In countries which recorded a decrease in inequality accompanied by an increase in mobility – 
Denmark,  Belgium  and  Spain  -  the  structure  of  inequality  did  not  change  much  in  2001 
compared  with  1994.  Mixed  trends  across  cohort  are  observed  in  Denmark  and  Belgium, 
whereas in Spain the share of permanent inequality decreased slightly for all cohorts. However, 
its  evolution  is  not  monotonic.  A  turnaround  in  the  evolution  of  the  share  of  permanent 
inequality is observed around 1998-1999, when the share started decreasing in Denmark and 
Spain, following the increase over the period 1994-1998.  
In Denmark, in 2001, for the oldest two cohorts the persistent variance accounts for roughly 
50%-60% of the overall variance, for the cohort born between 1961-1970 40%, whereas for the 
youngest cohort the variance is mostly transitory (90%). In Belgium, the rates are similar with 
Denmark for the oldest two cohorts and higher with roughly 10 percentage points for the rest. In 
Spain, the share of the permanent component is higher with roughly 10 percentage points for the 
oldest two cohorts and with roughly 20 percentage points for the youngest two than in Belgium.  
In countries that recorded a decrease in inequality and mobility - Germany, France, UK, Ireland 
and Austria -, the structure of inequality over the sample period changed to a large extent and led 
to  an  increase  in  the  share  of  the  permanent  inequality  for  all  cohorts,  except the  oldest  in 




In France and Ireland, a significant turnaround occurred in 1996, respectively 1997, when the 
share of permanent inequality started to decrease and implicitly mobility to increase. In Austria, 
1998 market the year of the turnaround. Until 1998, the share of permanent inequality increased 
sharply and was accompanied by a large drop in wage mobility. The share dropped and mobility 
increased in 1999, followed by stable evolution thereafter. 34 
 
In 2001, in Germany compared with Spain, the share of the permanent component for the oldest 
two cohorts is higher with roughly 10 percentage points, roughly equal for the second youngest 
cohort  and  higher  with  10  percentage  points  for  the  youngest.  Therefore,  in  Germany,  the 
persistency of earnings is higher than in Spain, and implicitly than in Belgium and Denmark. For 
France, the share of the persistent component is similar with Germany. In UK, the share of the 
persistent differentials was similar with Spain. In Ireland, the structure of inequality is similar 
with Germany, except for the youngest cohort where the share of the permanent component is 
almost double, suggesting a lower earnings volatility for Irish than for German youngsters. In 
Austria  permanent  differentials  account  for  60%  of  the  overall  variance  for the  oldest three 
cohorts and for 20% for the youngest one. These rates place Austria as the country with the 
lowest earnings persistency among the ones which recorded a decrease in earning inequality.  
In countries that recorded an increase in inequality and mobility – Netherlands - the share of the 
permanent inequality decreased over time. A significant changed occurred after 1998, when the 
share of permanent inequality started decreasing and offset the increasing trend which dominated 
the period before 1998. 
In countries that recorded an increase in inequality and a decrease in mobility – Luxembourg, 
Italy, Portugal, Greece and Finland – the share of permanent inequality increased over time. For 
all these countries, a turning point in the evolution of the share of permanent inequality appears 
to have occurred around 1998-1999.  
In 2001, Luxembourg has the highest shares of the permanent component among all countries 
recording an increase in overall inequality: roughly 80% for the oldest three cohorts and 40% for 
the youngest one. Next, in terms of earnings persistency in 2001, we find Italy, with slightly 
lower shares for all cohorts. In Portugal, the structure is very similar with Italy, except for the 
youngest  cohort,  for  which  the  share  is  half  the  one  in  Italy,  signalling  a  higher  earnings 
volatility for youngsters in Portugal. In Greece, the share of the persistent component is lower 
with roughly 10 percentage points for the oldest two cohorts, similar for the second youngest 
cohort and more than double for the youngest cohort than in Portugal. This suggests that earnings 
volatility for the youngest cohort is lower than in Portugal and is similar with Luxembourg and 
Italy. In Finland, the share of the permanent component for the oldest two and the youngest 35 
 
cohorts is similar with Greece, whereas for the second youngest the share is higher with roughly 
10 percentage points than in Greece.  
9.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this study was to analyze what are the driving forces behind the changes in the 
distribution of labour market income across 14 EU countries over the period 1994-2001 using 
ECHP. Earnings inequality, as measured by the variance in log earnings was found to decrease in 
Germany,  Denmark,  Belgium,  France,  UK,  Ireland,  Spain,  Austria  and  to  increase  in 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Finland. We examined the extent to which 
these changes in cross-sectional inequality were determined by changes in transitory and/or in 
permanent earnings differentials.  
For all countries individual earnings inequality contains a highly permanent component for the 
oldest three cohorts and a highly transitory component for the youngest cohort. Regarding the 
structure of inequality, the permanent component appears to account for a higher share of the 
overall variance the older the cohort is. This is consistent with the evidence of lifecycle earnings 
divergence  showing  that older  cohorts  experience  a  lower  earnings  volatility  compared  with 
younger cohorts. Moreover, inequality in the temporary component of earnings accounts for the 
highest share for the youngest cohort, which reinforces the expectation that earnings volatility is 
higher at younger ages.  
Increases  in  inequality  appear to reflect  increases  in permanent differentials  in  Luxembourg, 
Italy,  Greece  and  Finland,  and  increases  in  both  components  in  Portugal  and  Netherlands. 
Decreases in inequality appear to result from decreases in transitory differentials in Germany, 
France,  UK  and  Ireland,  in  permanent  differentials  in  Belgium  and  Spain  and  in  both 
components in Denmark and Austria. In most countries, increases in inequality appear to be 
accompanied  by  decreases  in  mobility,  except  for  Netherlands.  Decreases  in  inequality  are 
accompanied by increases in mobility only in Denmark, Belgium and Spain.  
More  important  are the  welfare  implications  of  these  trends.  In  Luxembourg,  Italy,  Greece, 
Finland  and  Portugal,  it  appears  that  besides  the  widening  wages  differentials,  low  wage 
individuals find it harder to better their position in the wage distribution in 2001 compared with 
the first wave. Hence, in 2001, low wage individuals are worse off both in terms of the relative 36 
 
wage they receive and in terms of the opportunity of escaping the low-pay trap. In Netherlands, 
mobility  appears  to  exacerbate  cross-sectional  inequality,  meaning  that  the  rich  might  have 
gotten  richer  and  the  poor  poorer.  In  Denmark,  Belgium  and  Spain,  mobility  appears  to  be 
beneficial. In 2001, low wage individuals are better off both in terms of the relative wage they 
receive and in terms of the opportunities to escape the low-wage trap. In Austria, Germany, 
France, UK and Ireland, low-wage individuals are worse off in 2001 in terms of the opportunity 
to escape the low-wage trap, but their relative position in the earnings distribution is improved, 
most probably because of the reduction in wage differentials between the top and the bottom of 
the distribution. The reduction in mean wage in Austria might signal a reduction in top incomes. 
The  evolution  of  the  inequality  structure  and  earnings  mobility  was  not  monotonic.  Most 
countries experienced a sharp turnaround around 1996-1999 which could  be  linked with the 
turnaround in the institutional and policy framework experienced by EU countries after 1995. 
Hence, an interesting topic for future research is to explore the role of labour market factors in 
explaining cross-national differences in permanent inequality, transitory inequality and earnings 
mobility. Moreover, the link between earnings mobility and the two components can be explored 
more  in  depth  by  looking  at  different  mobility  measures,  including  long  and  short  period 
mobility.  37 
 
10. TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Mean hourly earnings and number of individuals with positive earnings 
 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Germany  Mean  9.43  9.49  9.61  9.52  9.57  9.48  9.60  9.72 
 
N  25018  26059  25806  24889  23290  22955  21909  20703 
Denmark  Mean  10.89  11.40  11.58  11.61  11.86  11.85  12.02  12.08 
 
N  20899  20399  19190  19062  17321  16235  15678  15380 
Netherlands  Mean  9.69  9.56  9.59  9.70  10.02  9.88  10.04  9.91 
 
N  33277  32384  31564  30575  28731  27460  25790  33277 
Belgium  Mean  8.48  8.82  8.71  8.75  8.81  8.83  8.92  9.10 
 
N  20221  22100  22892  22753  22863  23233  24065  24130 
Luxembourg  Mean  16.18  15.81  16.73  17.39  17.15  17.22  17.10 
 
N  15829  13695  14489  13403  14075  12667  12992 
France
10  Mean  10.23  9.92  9.87  10.05  10.33  10.60  10.55  10.87 
 
N  20137  19270  19042  17906  14467  14012  13760  14212 
UK  Mean  8.16  8.11  8.22  8.34  8.68  9.01  9.21  9.68 
 
N  24949  25329  25495  26010  26145  25750  25674  25264 
Ireland  Mean  9.30  9.54  9.76  10.02  10.43  10.84  11.69  12.44 
 
N  13937  13221  12590  12515  12435  12091  10745  9727 
Italy  Mean  7.16  6.91  6.96  7.05  7.29  7.37  7.28  7.32 
 
N  32633  32236  32111  29661  28865  26993  26912  25170 
Greece  Mean  4.95  5.03  5.23  5.59  5.63  5.85  5.70  5.77 
 
N  27974  27654  26150  24865  22675  22001  21335  21929 
Spain  Mean  6.83  6.95  7.09  6.89  7.18  7.37  7.45  7.42 
 
N  22559  21863  21296  20975  20371  20580  19898  20185 
Portugal  Mean  9.08  8.33  8.37  8.49  8.55  8.55  8.54  9.08 
 
N  14653  15450  15379  15087  14837  14569  14604  14550 
Austria  Mean    9.08  8.33  8.37  8.49  8.55  8.55  8.54 
 
N    17944  17789  17199  16209  15162  13816  13056 
Finland  Mean      7.89  8.01  8.41  8.45  8.66  8.86 
 
N      15811  15845  15895  15546  13329  13057 
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Table  2.  Number  and  share  of  individuals  present  in  the  sample  in  year  1 t −   which  record 
positive earnings in year t 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Germany 
Freq.  23956  25224  24197  22814  22321  21290  20107 
%  66.99  67.37  66.2  63.01  64.84  64.86  64.39 
Denmark 
Freq.  19854  18527  18110  16442  15334  14865  14642 
%  68.74  66.59  69.43  66.23  67.41  69.6  71.6 
Belgium 
Freq.  33277  32384  31564  30575  28731  27460  25790 
%  63.43  63.65  64.38  63.88  64.28  65.15  64.38 
Netherlands 
Freq.  20578  21328  21221  21055  20545  21026  21341 




13417  12498  13190  12257  12402  11457 
% 
 
64.75  69.48  69.33  69.81  68.71  70.39 
France 
Freq.  19143  18197  17243  14014  12209  12080  12468 
%  62.47  64.76  62  52.08  54.24  55.54  60.8 
UK 
Freq.  24511  24848  25303  25278  25006  24881  24467 
%  64.59  66.31  67.06  67.04  67.36  68.33  68.58 
Ireland 
Freq.  12750  12217  12212  12020  11668  10236  9507 
%  49.99  50.04  52.41  53.13  54.1  51.63  54.65 
Italy 
Freq.  30946  31028  28717  27188  25717  25348  24139 
%  51.58  51.19  47.18  47.34  46.87  48.73  48.86 
Greece 
Freq.  26868  25946  24385  21815  20357  20443  21342 
%  45.83  45.69  44.98  42.09  43.52  46.06  49.72 
Spain 
Freq.  21460  20521  20329  19456  19679  19167  19352 
%  47.6  48.29  48.49  48.63  52.13  52.12  56.06 
Portugal 
Freq.  13892  14538  14321  13977  13921  13952  13942 




16472  16384  15634  14551  13403  12601 
% 
 
67.96  68.2  67.49  67.2  66.51  68.21 
Finland 
Freq. 
   
15246  15345  14753  12756  12588 
% 
   
55.95  57.2  59.29  53.83  64.16 39 
 
 






















































































































































































































Covariance(t, t-2) Covariance(t, t-3)
Covariance(t, t-4) Covariance(t, t-5)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Cohort born 1971-1981
Finland





































Permanent Component                             
2 exp( ) estimate µ σ =
 
7.2609  0.0867  0.0097  0.5891  0.1913  0.0905  0.0698  0.0246  0.1653  0.0293  0.1071  0.0251  0.0467  0.2467 
2 exp( ) estimate ϕ σ =
 
0.0024  0.0968      0.0002  0.0797              0.0001  0.1032 
cov( , ) µ ϕ   -0.1313  0.0121     
-
0.0052 




2 exp( ) estimate π σ =       0.0014  0.1494                     
Time shifters,  1,1994 1 λ =                            
1,1995 λ
  1.0734  0.0084  1.0185  0.0210  0.9735  0.0158  0.9421  0.0116  1.0511  0.0129  1    0.9915  0.0082 
1,1996 λ
  1.1503  0.0112  0.9910  0.0209  0.9748  0.0172  1.0041  0.0122  1.1058  0.0130  1.0215  0.0220  0.9070  0.0103 
1,1997 λ
  1.2028  0.0142  0.9011  0.0231  0.9334  0.0159  0.9225  0.0145  1.1338  0.0144  1.1810  0.0208  0.9228  0.0126 
1,1998 λ
  1.2720  0.0215  0.9022  0.0256  0.9876  0.0169  0.8915  0.0160  1.1295  0.0173  1.2493  0.0222  0.8936  0.0146 
1,1999 λ
  1.4078  0.0188  0.7953  0.0257  0.8963  0.0184  0.7853  0.0162  1.1257  0.0181  1.3205  0.0248  0.8571  0.0154 
1,2000 λ
  1.5155  0.0222  0.7431  0.0287  0.8749  0.0193  0.9245  0.0170  1.0581  0.0188  1.3425  0.0314  0.7802  0.0163 
1,2001 λ
  1.4744  0.0280  0.7643  0.0264  0.9096  0.0208  0.9207  0.0156  1.0842  0.0186  1.2977  0.0222  0.7982  0.0175 
Cohort shifters,  1,40 50 1 γ − =                            
1,51 60 γ −   0.4401  0.0145  1.0630  0.0306  1.2748  0.0424  1.0127  0.0138  0.8589  0.0139  0.9557  0.0189  1.4131  0.0301 
1,61 70 γ −   0.2031  0.0088  1.0950  0.0704  1.3168  0.1144  0.7776  0.0105  0.7796  0.0131  0.9396  0.0183  2.0459  0.0992 
1,71 80 γ −   0.0856  0.0046  0.9890  0.1467  0.7891  0.0704  0.1425  0.0387  0.5000  0.0178  0.5933  0.0183  2.4514  0.2435 
Transitory Component                             
2 exp( ) estimate ε σ =   0.2578  0.5741  0.1315  0.2626  0.1262  0.3096  0.2439  0.1523  0.7969  0.5779  0.0186  0.1671  0.0702  0.1110 
2
0 exp( ) estimate σ =                              43 
 
2
0,40 50 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0044  0.7316  0.0368  0.0732  0.0228  0.0913  0.0639  0.0437  0.1039  0.0491  0.0753  0.0638  0.0764  0.0437 
2
0,51 60 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0562  0.0887  0.0255  0.0810  0.0271  0.1208  0.0357  0.0663  0.0913  0.0902  0.1064  0.1109  0.0789  0.0605 
2
0,61 70 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0419  0.0940  0.0349  0.0725  0.0112  0.2073  0.0392  0.0535  0.0486  0.0843  0.0672  0.1136  0.0750  0.0681 
2
0,71 80 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0832  0.0679  0.0284  0.0705  0.0406  0.0962  0.0347  0.0596  0.0956  0.0966  0.0225  0.1220  0.0313  0.1179 
ρ   0.3583  0.0223  0.5472  0.0732  0.3289  0.0118  0.6280  0.0104  0.3993  0.0254  0.2389  0.0161  0.4512  0.0125 
θ                              
Time shifters,  2,1994 1 λ =                            
2,1995 λ
  0.4531  0.1298  0.3697  0.0502  0.4936  0.0756  0.2941  0.0226  0.2517  0.0739  1    0.8214  0.0418 
2,1996 λ
  0.3801  0.1088  0.3548  0.0508  0.4839  0.0771  0.2396  0.0181  0.1703  0.0504  1.9774  0.1487  0.8135  0.0475 
2,1997 λ
  0.3480  0.1008  0.3531  0.0483  0.4839  0.0756  0.2677  0.0202  0.1963  0.0572  1.4402  0.1377  0.7179  0.0406 
2,1998 λ
  0.3511  0.1013  0.3077  0.0409  0.3287  0.0505  0.2784  0.0209  0.2373  0.0676  1.0818  0.0915  0.7025  0.0359 
2,1999 λ
  0.3886  0.1121  0.4086  0.0543  0.3875  0.0605  0.3371  0.0255  0.2284  0.0650  1.2422  0.1019  0.7140  0.0377 
2,2000 λ
  0.2918  0.0841  0.3980  0.0538  0.4541  0.0710  0.2704  0.0201  0.2432  0.0696  1.3644  0.1127  0.8482  0.0482 
2,2001 λ
  0.3957  0.1147  0.3595  0.0484  0.5629  0.0877  0.3255  0.0257  0.2346  0.0675  1.4003  0.1195  0.7977  0.0453 
Cohort shifters,  2,40 50 1 γ − =                            
2,51 60 γ −   0.9547  0.0299  1.1521  0.0265  1.0459  0.0294  1.0555  0.0189  0.9383  0.0293  0.8573  0.0355  0.8949  0.0171 
2,61 70 γ −   0.9643  0.0268  1.2128  0.0205  1.1180  0.0313  0.9996  0.0140  1.0469  0.0303  1.0445  0.0429  0.9938  0.0182 
2,71 80 γ −   1.3832  0.0411  1.8237  0.0325  1.7278  0.0464  1.3569  0.0233  1.5123  0.0465  1.4318  0.0595  1.1898  0.0224 
SSR  0.0143  0.0068  0.0099  0.0047  0.0240  0.0222  0.0061 
2 χ   2473.7073  5872.5492  2492.7787  17769.4220  1756.3574  1632.2320  2597.3157 
LogL  459.2576  512.8864  486.0084  540.0406  421.9693  318.4753  520.5053 
   44 
 



























Param.  SE  Param.  Param.  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE  Param.  SE 
Permanent Component                             
2 exp( ) estimate µ σ =
 
0.0564  0.3502  0.0325  0.0325  0.0779  0.0915  0.294  0.059  0.2561  0.0303  0.0811  0.0449  0.0616  0.2703 
2 exp( ) estimate ϕ σ =
 
0.0002  0.1435  0.00008  0.00008  0.0002  0.0582  0.000  0.000          0.0001  0.1399 
cov( , ) µ ϕ   -0.0029  0.0007  -0.0014  -0.0014 
-
0.0034 




Time shifters,  1,1994 1 λ =                              
1,1995 λ
  0.9784  0.0114  0.9529  0.0112  1.0205  0.0145  1.010  0.012  0.9767  0.0119  1       
1,1996 λ
  0.9230  0.0126  0.9548  0.0184  0.9970  0.0194  0.973  0.017  1.0414  0.0124  1.0112  0.0244  1   
1,1997 λ
  0.9602  0.0167  0.9085  0.0212  1.0386  0.0229  0.972  0.022  1.0176  0.0140  1.0570  0.0287  1.1265  0.0193 
1,1998 λ
  0.9141  0.0185  0.9868  0.0267  1.0104  0.0239  0.976  0.027  1.0187  0.0157  0.9843  0.0291  1.0778  0.0232 
1,1999 λ
  0.8559  0.0193  0.9983  0.0292  1.0606  0.0238  0.959  0.032  0.9875  0.0171  0.9081  0.0379  1.0173  0.0274 
1,2000 λ
  0.7928  0.0215  0.9704  0.0307  0.9236  0.0227  0.898  0.036  1.0925  0.0194  0.9403  0.0391  0.9554  0.0266 
1,2001 λ
  0.7770  0.0249  0.9476  0.0335  0.9267  0.0207  0.867  0.040  1.0758  0.0199  0.9425  0.0384  1.0297  0.0309 
Cohort shifters, 1,40 50 1 γ − =                              
1,51 60 γ −   1.3594  0.0443  1.2272  0.0463  1.3261  0.0233  1.162  0.074  0.9340  0.0178  0.8921  0.0198  1.3819  0.0485 
1,61 70 γ −   2.0128  0.1621  1.3857  0.1189  1.9371  0.0811  0.988  0.120  0.7691  0.0162  0.8354  0.0262  2.4403  0.1705 
1,71 80 γ −   2.9811  0.4996  1.5606  0.2008  3.9268  0.4940  0.475  0.078  0.3140  0.0203  0.4591  0.0293  2.9792  0.7975 
Transitory Component                             
2 exp( ) parameter ε σ =   0.0285  0.1649  0.0582  0.0758  0.1183  0.0750  0.099  0.006  0.2584  0.2067  0.4830  0.1811  0.0555  0.2197 
2
0 exp( ) estimate σ =               0.052  0.004  0.0428  0.0974  0.0751  0.0652     45 
 
2
0,40 50 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0709  0.0825  0.0314  0.0898  0.0791  0.0516              0.0550  0.0743 
2
0,51 60 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0688  0.0966  0.0422  0.0619  0.0574  0.0702              0.0588  0.0701 
2
0,61 70 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0942  0.0869  0.0521  0.0592  0.1011  0.0436              0.0707  0.0727 
2
0,71 80 exp( ) estimate σ − =
 
0.0801  0.1015  0.0283  0.0919  0.0695  0.1269              0.0464  0.1098 
ρ   0.2912  0.0229  0.6438  0.0428  0.5995  0.0346  0.849  0.024  0.7785  0.0149  0.7009  0.0292  0.2904  0.0195 
θ       -0.2506  0.0204 
-
0.1487 
0.0242  -0.364  0.007             
Time loading factors, 
2,1994 1 λ =                              
2,1995 λ
  1.2269  0.0938  0.7692  0.0239  0.7991  0.0261  0.907  0.027  0.5061  0.0525  1       
2,1996 λ
  1.2789  0.1050  0.8238  0.0294  0.6992  0.0277  0.815  0.024  0.3117  0.0367  0.2929  0.0291  1   
2,1997 λ
  1.0434  0.0818  0.7296  0.0241  0.6171  0.0280  0.842  0.024  0.3536  0.0383  0.2089  0.0224  0.8849  0.0977 
2,1998 λ
  1.0924  0.0853  0.7536  0.0264  0.6269  0.0275  0.887  0.023  0.3723  0.0397  0.1724  0.0196  0.7069  0.0809 
2,1999 λ
  1.0595  0.0821  0.6516  0.0242  0.6106  0.0256  0.760  0.021  0.3555  0.0371  0.2270  0.0223  0.9301  0.0957 
2,2000 λ
  1.0816  0.0876  0.6656  0.0225  0.7195  0.0287  0.821  0.022  0.3484  0.0362  0.2203  0.0220  0.8191  0.0861 
2,2001 λ
  1.1093  0.0968  0.6998  0.0234  0.6657  0.0287  0.856  0.023  0.3921  0.0400  0.2248  0.0229  0.7937  0.0852 
Cohort specific factors, 
2,40 50 1 γ − =                              
2,51 60 γ −   0.9889  0.0352  0.9894  0.0204  0.9608  0.0179  1.004  0.025  0.7800  0.0383  0.8410  0.0254  0.8609  0.0253 
2,61 70 γ −   1.0987  0.0403  1.0324  0.0217  1.0187  0.0183  1.051  0.025  1.0102  0.0399  0.8986  0.0280  0.8714  0.0252 
2,71 80 γ −   1.1532  0.0458  1.3299  0.0278  0.9443  0.0256  1.330  0.030  1.1072  0.0409  1.1979  0.0416  1.2070  0.0349 
SSR  0.0273  0.0017  0.0146  0.0094  0.0288  0.0052  0.0038 
2 χ   2116.2117  1576.2281  3824.4496  1984.9587  3737.5070  2229.2852  945.1045 
LogL  412.7881  611.7874  458.0054  489.8478  408.9498  399.6179  300.6177 46 
 
Table 4. Alternative Model Specifications 
  Alternative Model  SSR  Chi2  LogL  Parameters 
Germany  PI+AR1  .0171  3333.3328  446.4264  27 
PI+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0168  2598.8668  447.7299  26 
Canonical Model  0.3314  43238.681  233.051  2 
Denmark  PI+AR1  0.0069  5825.6657  511.8177  27 
RW+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0069  6308.8755  511.6101  25 
Canonical model  0.0273  29378.035  412.7862  2 
Netherlands  PI+AR1  .0104  2671.5118  482.3131  27 
RG+AR, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   .0107  2700.0947  480.0743  26 
Canonical model  0.0769  24373.43  338.163  2 
Belgium  PI+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =    0.005  18832.583  533.4292  24 
Canonical model  0.0751  46706.478  339.8958  2 
France  PI+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0255  1817.4386  417.7385  24 
Canonical model  0.3668  8599.1199  225.739  2 
Luxembourg   PI+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.026  1900.723  309.4077  22 
PI+ARMA(1,1)  0.0222  1633.305  318.5007  26 
Canonical model  0.2064  35231.176  193.6939  2 
UK  PI+AR1  0.0072  2782.613  508.905  27 
Canonical model  0.1062  12248.666  314.9804  2 
Ireland  PI+AR1  0.0323  2125.021  400.506  27 
RG+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0276  2324.4346  412.13  26 
Canonical model  0.2028  24662.992  268.4008  2 
Italy   PI+ARMA(1,1)  0.002  1641.5036  598.0915  28 
RG+ARMA(1,1), 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =    0.002  1646.3788  598.1981  27 
RG+AR1  0.002  1899.3595  600.8606  29 
Canonical model  0.097  12434.997  12434.997  2 
Greece  RG+ARMA(1,1), 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0153  3996.5599  454.4974  27 
RG+AR1  0.0147  3945.6763  457.1551  29 
Canonical model  0.2507  26975.122  253.1378  2 
Spain  PI+ARMA(1,1), 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0098  2013.2298  486.3516  25 
RG+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0109  2032.9304  478.5467  26 
Canonical model  0.551  11817.977  196.4497  2 
Portugal  RW+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0273  5456.5912  412.8313  25 
PI+AR1  0.0274  15350.702  412.4226  27 
PI+ARMA(1,1), 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0261  7753.2688  415.9961  25 
Canonical model  1.208  38920.003  139.9288  2 
Austria  PI+AR1  0.0049  2382.0622  402.5245  25 
Simple model  0.0539  15059.202  268.8687  2 
Finland  PI+AR1  0.0049  1044.3253  290.5622  23 
RG+AR1, 
2 2
0 0,cohort σ σ =   0.0039  947.6261  298.9057  22 
Canonical model  0.0197  6678.3651  231.7795  2 47 
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Figure 3. Actual and Predicted Variance of Earnings with Permanent and Transitory 
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Figure 3. Actual and Predicted Variance of Earnings with Permanent and Transitory Predicted 
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Figure 5. Predicted Permanent and Transitory Variance as % of Predicted Overall Variance for 
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Figure 5. Predicted Permanent and Transitory Components of Earnings as % of Predicted 
Overall Variance for Selected Cohorts: 1994-2001 (continued) 52 
 
11. ANNEX 
11.1.  The Specification of the covariance structure of earnings 
The covariance structure for the first sample period takes the form: 
0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2
1 10 0 2 20 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1,0 0 0 2 2,0 0
2 2 2 2
0 0 0
( ) ( )
[ ( ) ] ( )
( 2 ) ( )
( ) 2cov( ) ( ) ( 20) ( ) 0
ic ic ic
c i i i ia c i i
c i i i i i i ia c i
i i i i i
Var Y E r r
E age u E v v
E age age u Var v
E age E age a Var v if t µ ϕ π
γ λ µ ϕ γ λ
γ λ µ ϕ µϕ γ λ
σ σ µϕ σ
= =
= + + + =
= + + + + =
= + + + − + =
      (18) 
The covariance structure implied by the model introduced in the previous section takes the following 
form. The variance of the process can be expressed as follows: 
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